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Much recent work in the philosophy of science has been concerned with 
the problem of the growth of scientific knowledge. This work has provided 
an important corrective to positivist philosophy of science and analytic 
epistemology, which have concentrated on describing the structure of 
knowledge. Through the efforts of Kuhn and other historically oriented 
philosophers ([16], [17], [18]), it has become increasingly clear that any ac- 
count of the structure of knowledge must be sufficiently rich to accom- 
modate a complex account of how knowledge grows. The enterprise of 
developing an integrated description of the growth and structure of knowl- 
edge might be termed "historical epistemology". 
Hegel was one of the first historical epistemologists. His dialectic can be 
taken as a general theory of development, but with special applicability to 
the development of knowledge. There are important structural similarities 
between the dialectic and the growth of scientific knowledge, although 
there are also interesting differences. To bring out the similarities and 
differences, I offer a set-theoretic formalization of the dialectic. I do not 
thereby claim to have formalized Hegel's dialectic, a truly formidable pro- 
ject on which numerous attempts have been made ([1], [3], [6], [15], [23], 
[24], [25], [36]). The task of giving a fully adequate representation of the 
dialectic probably outstrips any formal technique, since the dialectic has 
many conceptual and pragmatic aspects. Nevertheless, it is possible for- 
mally to capture some of the essential features of such central notions as 
dialectical negation and contradiction, AuJheben, and the Absolute. The 
formalism then can be used to exhibit parallels between Hegel's account of 
the growth of knowledge and contemporary views on theory change. 
It is commonly believed that an essential feature of Hegel's dialectic is 
the admission of logical contradictions. R. Routley and R. K. Meyer [24] 
use relevance logic to accommodate contradictions of the sort p & ~p, 
but I take this to be at best an incidental aspect of Hegel's dialectic. He- 
gel's dialectic essentially concerns the dynamics of conceptual structures, 
and a formalization can be based on the following conclusions. (1) Dia- 
lectic "logic" is not a logic of sentences or propositions, but a general 
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theory of the development of conceptual structures. (2) These conceptual 
structures can best be represented not syntactically, but set-theoretically, 
using the formalism developed for the "non-statement" or "structuralist" 
account of scientific theories by J. D. Sneed [26] and W. Stegmtiller [27], 
[28]. (3) The structure of Hegel's dialectic bears important similarities to 
the structure of the growth of scientific knowledge as interpreted in a non- 
positivist manner; in particular each stage of the dialectic bears the same 
sort of complex relation to the previous stage as a scientific theory does to 
its predecessor. (4) Hence the Sneed-Stegmiiller account of the dynamics 
of theories can be adapted to provide a formalization of Hegel's dialectic. 
Hegel's thought is complex and difficult, but it is possible to present the 
central features of the dialectic with a minimum of obscurity. I take dialec- 
tic to be a general theory of development. Hegel says that "wherever there 
is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect 
in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work." ([9], p. 148.) Hegel himself 
applies the dialectic to consciousness in [10], to history in [11], to the 
history of philosophy in [8], and in full generality to logical categories in 
[12]. In the first of these, Hegel describes the development of consciousness 
from a form having only the most primitive kind of knowledge to the form 
which is capable of absolute knowledge. In the last, he describes the devel- 
opment of the "Not ion"  from the most primitive category, Being, to a 
category which encompasses everything, the Absolute Idea. According to 
Hegel, the structure of each process is the same, for he says of conscious- 
ness that "the development of this object, like the development of all 
natural and spiritual life, rests solely on the nature of the pure essentialities 
which constitute the content of logic." ([12], p. 28.) However, the relation 
of Hegel's dialectic to the growth of scientific knowledge is much clearer in 
the dialectic of stages of consciousness in [10] than in the pure dialectic of 
concepts in [12], since the Phenomenology [10] is specifically concerned 
with the development of knowledge by a subject. Hence my discussion is 
primarily relevant to the dialectic of consciousness described in that work. 
Each stage in the dialectial process gives rise to a succeeding stage which 
is said to be its negation. This notion of negation is very different from 
anything in propositional logic. The result of a dialectical, or "determi- 
nate" negation ([10], p. 137) is very complex: each new stage both super- 
sedes and incorporates the stage which it negates. ([9], p. 152, [12], p. 54.) 
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The process is best described by the untranslatable German verb AuJheben, 
since its meaning includes both (1) to clear away or annul, and (2) to keep 
or preserve. ([9], p. 180, [12], pp. 106 ft.) By means of such operations of 
supersession and incorporation, progress is made toward the Absolute. 
Negation in each stage is necessitated by the possession of the stage of 
internal "contradictions" which show that the Absolute has not yet been 
reached. 
The double aspect of dialectical negation and Aujheben makes formal 
representation very difficult. It would be tempting to take two dialectical 
stages Si and S t as propositions, define some negation operator N, then 
arrive at some such formula as Sj = N(Si) or N(Si) ~Sj. But syntactic 
means appear insufficient to capture the incorporating aspect of negation. 
Moreover, we must account for the properties of the negation of the nega- 
tion, which, Hegel stresses, "is not a neutralization." ([9], p. 178.) The 
propositional law of double negation does not apply in dialectics, since a 
second operation of negation leads on to a new, higher, more complex 
stage. The notion of the Absolute as the terminus of the process of succes- 
sive negation also seems inaccessible to syntactic treatment. 
To the rescue comes the set-theoretic apparatus of Sneed and Steg- 
mtilter. It should not seem odd that a formalism dealing with scientific 
theory change is applicable to Hegel's dialectic. Errol Harris [7] has de- 
scribed numerous parallels between dialectic and scientific method. Criti- 
cisms of positivist views of science have pushed the philosophy of science 
in several Hegelian directions, involving discussion of such topics as the 
dynamics of theories, conceptual change, and competition among theories. 
([5], [16], [17], [34].) On the positivist view of the growth of science, a theory 
subsumed previous ones in a steady process of accumulation. Formally 
this can be expressed as the deduction of a reduced theory, T~ from a re- 
ducing theory T~ plus bridge laws and coordinating definitions, where a 
theory is taken to be a set of sentences. Kuhn and others have argued that 
the degree of conceptual change from T~ to Tj is such that scientific pro- 
gress should not be viewed as mere accumulation. Instead, we seem to have 
a relation much like dialectical negation! T~ preserves the accomplishments 
of T~, but at the same time supersedes it in a conceptually radical manner. 
(Cf. [7], p. 14) Sneed and Stegrniiller make a sophisticated attempt to cap- 
ture this complex relation of theory replacement, and their methods can be 
adapted to Hegel's dialectic. 
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The adaptation is appropriate for an additional reason. Sneed and Steg- 
mtiller abandon the positivist view that a theory is a set of sentences, 
proposing instead that a theory is a conceptual structure characterized set- 
theoretically. Such a semantic approach to the philosophy of science has 
also been advocated by F. Suppe [29], P. Suppes [30], [31], and B. van 
Fraassen [37]. Of course the use of  set theory was unknown to Hegel, but 
not so the view that the representation of knowledge is essentially non- 
sentential. He says that "the propositional form ... is not suited to express 
the concrete - and the true is always concrete - or the speculative." ([9], 
p. 65) Both the Phenomenology of Mind and the Science of Logic employ 
a holistic epistemology (the true is the whole: [10], p. 81) which is much 
more consonant with the Sneed-Stegmtiller approach than with the tradi- 
tional Anglo-American epistemology. Heidegger seems similar to Hegel in 
his claim that assertion is only a derivative mode of interpretation. ([13], 
pp. 195 ft.) Another parallel is found in recent work in cognitive psy- 
chology and artificial intelligence, where many researchers have sup- 
plemented sentential representations of knowledge in favor of representa- 
tions employing larger data-structures called frames. (See [21], [35].) 
So much for preamble. I shall now present a simplified version of  the 
formalism of Sneed and Stegmiiller. Much of their apparatus, such as the 
construction of Ramsey sentences and the introduction of"par t ia l  possible 
models", can be omitted here because it concerns the problem of  theoreti- 
cal terms, which does not arise for Hegel. 
According to Sneed and Stegmiiller, the main functions of a theory are 
to pick a class M of models (in Tarski's sense 2) out of a class of possible 
models Mp, and to specify L the set of intended applications for M. M 
could be specified formally by an axiom system, where M consists of  those 
elements of Mp which satisfy the axioms and theorems of the system, or 
more directly in the manner of P. Suppes by means of a set-theoretic 
predicate. ([30], pp. 249 ff.) But without such specification we can still talk 
generally of a theory as a structure ( K , / ) ,  where K is said to be the core 
of  the theory consisting of  the pair (M, My), such that M c My, and I 
is the set of  the intended applications such that I c Mp. A theory con- 
strued as such a structure cannot be said to be true or false, but it can be 
used to make a basic claim. ([27], p. 48.) The claim is that the models 
which constitute the intended applications of  the theory are in fact among 
the models picked out by the theory: I c M. For scientific theories, the 
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basic claim is an empirical one, asserting the adequacy of the theory in 
representing empirical phenomena; but in Hegel's dialectic, the basic claim 
will be purely conceptual. 
We can identify stages of the dialectic with conceptual structures S of 
the form (K, /). Let S i = ( K  i, l l )  where K i = (M/, Mp), and let S j =  
(Kt, It) where K t -- (M~, Mp). Now we can characterize: S t is a dialectical 
negation of Si if and only if 
(1) I i c I~ 
(2) M~ r Mj 
(3) (6 c~ ~ )  = Mj. 
Pictorially, the situation is as in Figure 1 : 
Fig. 1. 
As desired, Sj both surpasses and incorporates Si. The incorporation is 
represented in clause (1) by the fact that Sj has all the applications which 
Si has. In terms of scientific theories, we could say that S t explains every- 
thing which S~ did. But the transition from Si to S t is not simply cumulative 
since clause (2) guarantees that S t and Si pick out different models. The 
motivation of clause (3) is more complex: we suppose that the inadequacy 
of stage S~ derives from its failure to include among its models M~ some 
of its intended applications/~. Then the shaded area I~ c~ ~ is very sig- 
nificant. Call this the set of "anomalies" of S~, since if we were thinking of 
Sz as a theory, we would consider I~ c~ ~ to represent phenomena which 
Si is supposed to deal with but does not. (Cf. [16], ch. VI.) S t shows itself 
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to be a proper replacement for Si by including the anomalies of Si among 
its models M s . 
We can say that the "contradiction" in S~ which necessitates its super- 
session is between the claim that I~ c M~ and the existence of anomalies 
I~ ~ ~ .  In the context of the dialectic, this contradiction is "real", since 
for the idealist Hegel conceptual structures are real. Although we have a 
logical contradiction between the claim and the recognition of the exis- 
tence of anomalies, Hegel's notion of contradiction is clearly more com- 
plex than that discussed by Routley and Meyer [24], since it is a contra- 
diction involving a specific sort of claim, not just any p & ~p. Moreover, 
the significance of Hegel's notion of contradiction is dynamic, indicating 
the need to move on to a higher stage S i. 
S i resolves the contradiction in S~ by including the anomalies in MS, as 
required by clause (3). Incorporation of the anomalies is thus represented, 
although what is more important is that S i has succeeded in overcoming 
the contradiction which defeats Si. Of course, we expect that Sj will have 
its own anomalies as represented in the above picture by the non-emptiness 
of I~ c~ h7~j. S s will then in turn be negated by some Sk. Obviously the 
negation of the negation Sk will not be equivalent to S~. Finally, note that 
if S i were justified in its claim that 1 i c MS, then clause (3) would follow 
from clause (1). Clause (3) would take on much greater importance if we 
weakened clause (1) so as not to require that all of I~ be in 1 i. This would 
be in accord with suggestions by L. Laudan [18] and others that in scien- 
tific growth some applications are simply abandoned, but the weakening 
of clause (1) does not appear necessary for the representation of dialectic. 
The formalization of negation given by clauses (1)-(3) obviously allows 
the existence of more than one N(S~) for each S~. To tighten matters up, 
we can introduce an additional clause requiring that S i go no further 
beyond Si than necessary to deal with the intended applications of S i. We 
then add to the definition of negation: 
(4) (MS. c~ Ij) = I i 
This restricts Sj to having as actual applications only the intended applica- 
tions of S~. The limitation is consonant with Hegel's conception of the 
dialectic as a gradual process, devoid of unnecessary leaps. However, 
clause (4) is not consistent with the growth of scientific knowledge where 
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we do not expect a theory to explain successfully only what its predecessor 
intended to explain; it should also deal with unanticipated phenomena. 3 
It can be objected that the above account is too conservative in sup- 
posing that the background class of possible models Mp remains the same 
in the transition from S i to S t. As Kuhn and others have argued, scientific 
advance often involves dramatic conceptual changes; and Hegel's own ex- 
amples of dialectical development also seem to involve the enrichment and 
replacement of concepts. Hence we would have to distinguish a set of pos- 
sible models Mp, for Si from a set Mp~ for Sj, without requiring that Mp, 
Mp; But this does not present any serious problem for the above definition 
of dialectical negation, since Hegel does not subscribe to the radical con- 
ceptual incommensurability which seems to be proposed by Kuhn. Hence 
we can presume the existence of considerable overlap between Mp, and 
Mp,, so that clauses (1)-(4) are not vitiated. All we need is the condition 
that li ~ Mp. This condition would not be appropriate for scientific pro- 
gress as described by Laudan and Kuhn, but it does fit with the cumulative 
nature of the dialectic, in which nothing is lost on the way to absolute 
knowledge. 
In the case of radical incommensurability between S i and Sj, we would 
find that Alp, ~ Mpj is the null set. It would then also follow that I~ c~ lj is 
the null set, and my definition of dialectical negation would be empty. 
However, despite some of Kuhn's more extreme remarks, successive theo- 
ries in science do not seem so fully incommensurable. We can grant that 
the concept of mass in relativity theory is importantly different from the 
concept of  mass in Newtonian mechanics, without supposing that the two 
theories represent different "worlds". Both theories are intended to apply 
to such systems of objects as our solar system. Hence there is at least some 
overlap between I~ and Ij and hence between Mp, and Mp; Similarly in 
Hegel, dialectical development is not so revolutionary as to require a con- 
tinually novel set of possible models. Such a requirement would be in- 
compatible with Hegel's profession that the meaning of AuJheben includes 
preservation as well as supersession. For preservation of previous stages in 
the dialectic, we must have considerable continuity in the possible models 
corresponding to the stages. In particular, we must have I~ ~ It, as clause 
(1) specifies. Otherwise, the relation between successive stages would be 
fully mysterious, and no notion of dialectical progress toward the Absolute 
would be possible. 
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In sum, S t incorporates  the applications o f  Si while introducing a novel 
conceptual  Structure adequate for the anomalies with which Si did not  deal. 
Compare  the first stage o f  the dialectic o f  consciousness in [10], which, 
Charles Taylor  has remarked ([32], p. 145), fits well Hegel 's own descrip- 
tion o f  the ascending dialectic. Taylor  describes the general operat ion o f  
the dialectic in the Phenomenology as follows: 
We start off with something which is intrinsically characterized by the purpose it is bent on 
realizing or the standard it must meet. We then show of this thing that it cannot effectively 
fulfill this purpose or meet the standard (and the 'cannot' here is one of conceptual necessity). 
We are up against a contradiction ([32], p. 131). 
Thus the stage o f  consciousness makes a basic claim concerning a purpose 
or  standard,  only to founder  on anomalies which refute the claim. The 
claim made  by sense-certainty, which is the first stage o f  consciousness in 
[10], is to provide " immediate  knowledge, knowledge of  the immediate",  
which is a "knowledge of  endless weal th" ([10], p. 149). Sense-certainty is 
supposed to achieve this rich, immediate knowledge th rough  a kind of  
radical empiricism, involving pure sense experience with no conceptual  
contribution. But Hegel argues that sense-certainty soon discovers the 
contradict ion that  mediat ion by means o f  universal concepts is unavoid-  
able. Taylor  summarizes this discovery as follows: 
Sensible certainty is supposed to be immeasurably rich compared to conceptual conscious- 
ness because nothing has yet been selected, or abstracted, or put in a category with other 
phenomena not now present. The whole scenery is there in its richness and particularity. But 
now we see that in order to know something about it we have to focus on some dimension 
or other of the reality before us. The great richness of this form of consciousness turns out to 
be merely apparent ([32], pp. 142f). 
Hegel takes sense-certainty th rough  several sub-stages designed to show 
the impossibility o f  unmediated knowing o f  particulars designated by 
"this",  "here",  or "now" .  He argues that  the failure o f  sense-certainty re- 
quires moving on to a stage o f  consciousness called perception, which ac- 
commodates  the mediat ion and universality which eliminated sense- 
certainty by viewing an object not  as a bare sense-datum but as a thing 
with properties. In terms o f  my  formalism, perception is the Sj which 
negates the S i sense certainty. Sense certainty has as its intended applica- 
tions knowledge of  particulars designated by "this",  "here"  and "now" .  
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But these examples show themselves to be anomalies since they cannot be 
accommodated within the barren conceptual structure of sense-certainty. 
Instead, they are dealt with by the much richer resources ("models") of 
perception. Perception is the dialectical negation of sense-certainty, since: 
(1) perception is intended to deal with all the knowledge which sense- 
certainty is, so that I i c It; (2) perception uses very different conceptual 
assumptions than sense certainty, so that M i r Mi; and (3) perception 
successfully deals with the knowledge of particulars which constituted 
anomalies for sense-certainty, so that (I i ~ ~ )  c M~. Perception in turn 
proves inadequate and gives way to understanding which employs a 
dynamic conception of force. Thus my formalization conforms to the early 
stages of the dialectic in the Phenomenologs  
Analogous developments can be found in the history of science. In the 
eighteenth century the dominant optical theory was Newton's theory that 
light consists of particles. This encountered anomalies concerning such 
phenomena as diffraction and polarization. It was superseded in the nine- 
teenth century by the wave theory of Young and Fresnel, which explained 
phenomena of reflection and refraction as successfully as the particle the- 
ory did, but also dealt with diffraction and polarization. But the wave the- 
ory also encountered anomalies or "contradictions", especially concerning 
the existence of the ether, and was in turn "negated" by the photon theory 
of Planck and Einstein. 
The point of the dialectical process is to achieve the stage where contra- 
dictions no longer arise; this ultimate, self-sutficient stage is called Abso- 
lute knowledge. We can develop a formal notion of the Absolute by con- 
sidering the set I of intended applications. In science, applications must be 
identified pragmatically by close attention to the concerns of a particular 
discipline. They are often isolated by paradigmatic examples, the "exem- 
plars" of [16], Postscript. Instead of applications we could speak equally 
well of classes of facts to be explained as in [34] or of problems to be solved 
as in [18]. 
Now let us make the unabashedly metaphysical assumption that we can 
speak of the set of all applications of science, that is the set of all classes 
of facts to be explained. Call this set IA. Then the Absolute is the stage 
S A such that K A = < M  A, Mp> and I A = M A. On the scientific analogy, the 
Absolute is just the theory that explains everything there is to explain. We 
might require only that I a be a subset of M A, but we need the stronger 
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assumption that I a = M a in order to guarantee that the Absolute be 
unique, as it obviously must be. 
This conception of the Absolute is very similar to Peirce's idea of the 
truth as that toward which science does or would converge. If science 
develops by accumulating more and more of the applications IA, it is easy 
to view reality as represented by that theory which models all those ap- 
plications, namely the Absolute. This holds even if some intended applica- 
tions are dropped off along the way and even if there is radical conceptual 
change. A case for scientific realism could thus be based on the assumption 
of the existence of IA. 
That is obviously an enormous assumption. Can we make sense of the 
notion of the set of all classes of facts to be explained? Problems of self- 
application immediately arise, if among the facts to be explained we in- 
clude the success of the Absolute in explaining facts. Absolute Knowledge 
would then somehow include knowledge about Absolute Knowledge, 
which threatens to set off an unmanageably infinite chain. A more modest 
Absolute is achieved if we identify it simply as a stage S, such that K, -= 
(M,, My) and it turns out that M, = I,. This stage picks out all and only 
the intended applications. Since there are no anomalies and no superflous 
models, supersession by another stage is unnecessary. The problem with 
this definition is that it guarantees neither existence nor the uniqueness of 
the Absolute, since no such stage S, might be reached, or some Sn might be 
reached temporarily before new elements of  I, are conceived which would 
restart the dialectic and perhaps lead to a later stable Absolute. Both these 
possibilities are incompatible with Hegel's assumptions about the dialectic 
of knowledge, which seem to require something like the set I a. However, 
the weaker sense of Absolute seems more appropriate for scientific knowl- 
edge, since we do not in fact know whether science will or would converge 
as Peirce supposed, or whether it might converge temporarily and then 
diverge again. 
Assuming a unique set I a, the Absolute is unique. But what of the earlier 
stages in the dialectic? Clearly the definition of N(Si) above does not guar- 
antee a unique negation of Si, since any number of structures could satisfy 
clauses (1)-(3), and even the more restrictive clause (4) does not produce 
uniqueness. Although Hegel thought of the dialectic as uniquely deter- 
mined, there is no general way to represent the necessity of each stage 
being succeeded by just the one which succeeds it. Only a pragmatic ac- 
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count can be given of why a certain stage S~ is the successor of S i, just as 
in science we can only roughly describe how the anomalies faced by a the- 
ory lead to the production of a successor theory. 
The growth of science occurs in time, but it is not clear whether the 
dialectic is essentially temporal. In the Logic, the pure dialectic of concepts 
is not intended to occur in time, but merely to represent the internal inter- 
connection of concepts. The dialectic of consciousness in the Phenome- 
nology has a more historical character, but even there Hegel usually seems 
to be working out conceptual rather than historical connections. Hence it 
is somewhat misleading to talk of a stage SJollowing a stage Si in the way 
in which one theory follows another in time. There is an ordering among 
conceptual stages in Hegel's dialectic, from the beginning stage up to the 
Absolute, but this ordering is conceptual or logical, not temporal. 
Another potentially misleading feature of my formalism is that it does 
not depict how progress from stage to stage is generated. The existence 
of anomalies in S i is said to necessitate its supersession, but what is the 
motive force which leads one on to St? In science, the motive force is the 
critical faculty of scientists seeking better theories, but Hegel stresses that 
it is not we who discern the inadequacy of a stage of consciousness and 
move on to the next; rather, consciousness examines itself([lO], p. 141). 
Thus a formalism for the dialectic ought to represent the internally gen- 
erated dynamic of dialectical development as well as the structure of suc- 
ceeding stages. Routley and Meyer [24] speak of a "static dialectical logic", 
but such an entity is of a piece with round squares. To represent develop- 
ment more fully, we would need a system richer than a logical formalism. 
Perhaps a computer program could be developed to provide a dynamic 
model of the dialectical process, or of the process of scientific theory 
change. 
To conclude, I shall briefly summarize the differences and similarities 
between Hegel's dialectic and the growth of scientific knowledge which the 
set-theoretic formalism has served to bring out. First the differences. (1) 
The dialectic preserves all previous applications. (2) Each dialectical stage 
is the necessary result of the previous one, in contrast to science where we 
allow the possibility that as a matter of historical accident a different the- 
ory could have filled a place in the history of science; and only a minimal 
leap from stage to stage is allowed. (3) The Absolute plays a teleological 
role in the dialectic and we are guaranteed to reach it. (4) The dialectic is 
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spur red  on  by c o n c e p t u a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  empi r i ca l  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
c la ims  and  results .  
Never the les s ,  the  s imi lar i t ies  b e t w e e n  the  d ia lec t ic  and  the  g r o w t h  o f  
scientific k n o w l e d g e  are  r e m a r k a b l e .  (1) K n o w l e d g e  is v i ewed  d y n a m i c a l -  
ly, as s o m e t h i n g  which  grows.  (2) But  g r o w t h  is n o t  s imple  a c c u m u l a t i o n  
since science and  the  d ia lec t ic  d i sp lay  the  t w o f o l d  c h a r a c t e r  o f  n e g a t i o n  
e m b o d y i n g  b o t h  p r e s e r v a t i o n  and  cance l l a t ion .  (3) G r o w t h  is spu r r ed  by 
a n o m a l i e s  and  the  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  w h a t  a t h e o r y  o r  
s tage  c la ims  to do  and  w h a t  it  ac tua l ly  does.  (4) T h e  beare rs  o f  k n o w l e d g e  
are  n o t  sentences  bu t  c o m p l e x  s t ruc tures .  4 
W e  have  seen h o w  the  f o r m a l i s m  for  t h e o r y  d y n a m i c s  o f  Sneed  and  
Stegm~iller can  be used  to  r ep resen t  Hege l ' s  n o t i o n  o f  d ia lec t ica l  n e g a t i o n  
and  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  AuJheben, and  the  A b s o l u t e ,  as well  as a n o t i o n  o f  
ver i s imi l i tude .  T h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  ind ica tes  b o t h  the  fer t i l i ty  o f  the  Sneed-  
StegmiJl ler  f o r m a l i s m  and  the  c o n t e m p o r a r y  r e l evance  o f  Hege l  fo r  the  
p h i l o s o p h y  o f  s c i e n c e )  
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NOTES 
1 Marxian dialectics, as described for example in Engels [4], concerns the development of 
economic and social structures, not conceptual ones. My formalism is not intended to apply 
to a materialist dialectic, although rough analogies can be drawn. 
2 Ordinarily in Tarskian semantics a model for a set S of sentences is an interpretation con- 
sisting of a domain of objects D and an assignment of objects and n-tuples of objects to 
constants and predicate letters of some specified language L, such that the sentences in S are 
true for the interpretation. See for example [19], pp. 4%51. Here we talk of models indepen- 
dently of the sentences true for them. A model can then be considered as an ordered set 
(D, R1, R2, R 3 . . . .  ) where D is a domain of objects as above, and each R i is a relation on 
D understood as an n-tuple of members of D. Such a model is a representation of a situation 
independently of any sentential description. See for example [38], p. 107. 
3 Clause (4) and most of the rest of this paragraph was suggested by John McCumber. 
4 In Sneed and Stegm~ller, the conceptual structures are set-theoretic. See [35] for an argu- 
ment that more elaborate data structures of the sort discussed in recent work in Artificial 
Intelligence are required for an account of the nature of scientific theories. 
5 I have benefitted greatly in writing this paper from numerous suggestions of John 
McCumber. I am also grateful to very helpful anonymous referees, to Jay Drydyk, and to 
commentators at the 1979 Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting, especially Eric Day- 
ton. For further discussion of historical epistemology, see [33]. 
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